A U T H O R C O P Y
The book explains why the four decisions enacted after the fall of Lehman Brothers were not as effective as expected. The G20's leaders' forum as financial crisis manager was concerned to provide macroeconomic stimulus programs supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending capacity increase. However, the IMF was rendered less important by Fed intervention, acting as international lender of last resort in many countries. Above all, the role of the G20 in coordinating monetary and fiscal policies is questionable as each government responded more to domestic political pressure rather than to global measures.
The role of Fed as world lender of last resort also contributed to the failure to weaken the US dollar as the dominant world currency. But the dollar mainly appreciated because demand for dollars and T-Bills increased. Uncertainty about global financial management encouraged the purchase, by governments and the private sector, of securities denominated in US dollars. On the other hand, the ability of the Euro to challenge dollar predominance was constrained by the outbreak of the European debt crisis after 2010.
Market-friendly international financial standards were not overturned despite various international regulatory reforms. This was mainly because of the political influence of private financial interests that favored maintaining market-friendly regulation. Macroprudential philosophy could and did justify stronger regulation, but a free-market mentality prevailed.
The FSB was a new international institution created in the wake of the 2008 crisis. Unfortunately, it lacked formal power to set international financial standards because membership in the body created no legal obligation to adhere to the standards recommended by the body. FSB pronouncements could be and were ignored. Enacting post-crisis international financial reforms was therefore slow and uneven. Some difficulties stemmed from factors preventing implementation of international standards before the crisis, including competitive pressures and lobbying by large financial institutions.
National politicians have long been reluctant to accept international constrains on their policy autonomy. They always find good reasons for keeping regulatory power in their own hands. This was reinforced by disappointing results of G20 and the FSB efforts to negotiate cooperative cross-border arrangements. As such, nation states remain the key pillars of global economic governance in the financial regulatory realm.
In sum, a number of factors contributed to the failure to enact fundamental reforms after the outbreak of the crisis. The economic weakness of Europe strengthened the economic dominance of the US dollar. Financial interests and neoliberal ideology influenced international policy choices. This, in turn, led to ineffective actions by key international bodies such as the IMF, the G20 leaders' forum and the FSB.
The book ends with a glimmer of hope that the crisis will generate positive long-term effects. Four possible future scenarios are set forth, two of which are desirable: strengthened international institutions and greater cooperation among countries. Its central message is that greater cohesion among political actors worldwide is necessary to revive the economy. This is an essential book for those wanting to discover the origins of the recent financial crisis and why international organizations have failed to resolve the underlying problems with our financial system. It provides an unconventional guide through the maze of the measures taken to contain the crisis.
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